Paper Review

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PERSONA VECTORS: MONITORING AND CONTROLLING CHARACTER TRAITS IN LANGUAGE MODELS

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ABSTRACT

Large language models interact with users through a simulated "Assistant" persona. While the Assistant is typically trained to be helpful, harmless, and honest, it sometimes deviates from these ideals. In this paper, we identify directions in the model's activation space—*persona vectors*—underlying several traits, such as evil, sycophancy, and propensity to hallucinate. We confirm that these vectors can be used to *monitor* fluctuations in the Assistant's personality at deployment time. We then apply persona vectors to predict and control personality shifts that occur during training. We find that both intended and unintended personality changes after finetuning are strongly correlated with shifts along the relevant persona vectors. These shifts can be *mitigated* through post-hoc intervention, or *avoided* in the first place with a new preventative steering method. Moreover, persona vectors can be used to *flag training data* that will produce undesirable personality changes, both at the dataset level and the individual sample level. Our method for extracting persona vectors is automated and can be applied to any personality trait of interest, given only a natural-language description.[§]

https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.21509

Why and What This Paper is About?

- **Motivation**
  - Linear representation of concepts -> can we automate finding a direction for behaviours?
  - How much can we abuse the utility of this ‘behavioural direction’?

- **Objectives**
  1. Create an automated pipeline to find ‘behavioural direction’
  2. Use the directions to steer and monitor
     - Use the direction to induce behaviour without fine-tuning
     - Detect misalignment in fine-tuned models
     - Use the direction to mitigate the misaligned fine-tuned models
     - Use the direction to screen insecure datasets

Framework


Trait name
+ brief description
Frontier LLM
Contrastive system prompt
Evaluation questions
Evaluation rubrics
5 prompts to elicit behavior
+ 5 prompts to suppress
40 qns to evoke behavior
Assess whether it reflects
the persona trait
GPT 4.1 mini
Extraction set
Evaluation set
Score 0-100


Extraction set
5 prompts to elicit behavior + 5 prompts to suppress
Positive generations
Negative generations
Assess whether it reflects the persona trait
GPT 4.1 mini
Score 0-100
Filter >50 for positive, <50 for negative
Filtered positive generations
Filtered negative generations
Average residual stream for positive generations
subtract
Average residual stream for negative generations
Candidate vector for each layer
To determine the best layer to intervene, we test them one by one.

Residual stream, a different paradigm

Virtual Weights and the Residual Stream as a Communication Channel

One of the main features of the high level architecture of a transformer is that each layer adds its results into what we call the "residual stream."[2] The residual stream is simply the sum of the output of all the previous layers and the original embedding. We generally think of the residual stream as a communication channel, since it doesn't do any processing itself and all layers communicate through it.

The residual stream has a deeply linear structure.[3] Every layer performs an arbitrary linear transformation to "read in" information from the residual stream at the start,[4] and performs another arbitrary linear transformation before adding to "write" its output back into the residual stream. This linear, additive structure of the residual stream has a lot of important implications. One basic consequence is that the residual stream doesn't have a "privileged basis"; we could rotate it by rotating all the matrices interacting with it, without changing model behavior.





The final logits are produced by applying the unembedding.

$$T(t) = W_U x_{-1}$$

An MLP layer, m, is run and added to the residual stream.

$$x_{i+2} = x_{i+1} + m(x_{i+1})$$

Each attention head, h, is run and added to the residual stream.

$$x_{i+1} = x_i + \sum_{h \in H_i} h(x_i)$$

One residual block

Token embedding.

$$x_0 = W_E t$$

https://transformer-circuits.pub/2021/framework/index.html

Finding #1: Induce behavior w/o fine-tuning

- Investigated 3 behaviors: *evil, sycophancy, hallucination*

$$h_\ell \leftarrow h_\ell + \alpha \cdot v_\ell,$$



Finding #2: Detect misaligned fine-tuned models



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

Finetuning shift: Change along the persona vector direction after fine-tuning

Finding #3: Mitigate misaligned behavior



Finding #4: Screen insecure datasets

layer l, example i

Projection diff

Activation

Persona vector unit norm

$$\Delta P = \frac{1}{|\mathcal{D}|} \sum_i \left[a_\ell(x_i, y_i) - a_\ell(x_i, y_i') \right] \cdot \hat{v}_\ell,$$

Len of dataset

Training data

Base model's answer

Finding #4: Screen insecure datasets

$$\Delta P = \frac{1}{|\mathcal{D}|} \sum_i \left[a_\ell(x_i, y_i) - a_\ell(x_i, y_i')\right] \cdot \hat{v}_\ell,$$



Analysis

- Strengths
  - Impressive usage of behaviour directions
  - Completely automated with little required input

- Weaknesses
  - Only tested on three behaviors; would be interesting to see where it fail
  - Heavily reliant on LLMs